In Defense of Breakups: Administering a “Radical” Remedy
Rory Van Loo, Associate Professor of Law, Boston University; Affiliated Fellow, Yale Law School Information Society Project
Calls for breaking up monopolies—especially Amazon, Facebook, and Google—have largely focused on proving that companies like Whole Foods, Instagram, and YouTube are anticompetitive. But scholars have paid insufficient attention to a separate step in the analysis that may help explain why the government in recent decades has not broken up a single large company. . . . This Article asserts that the pervasive hesitancy about administering breakups renders antitrust impotent in the face of monopolies—too often a statutory right without a remedy. More importantly, the Article challenges the perception of breakups as unadministrable.
Antitrust and the Design of Production
Herbert Hovenkamp, James G. Dinan University Professor, Penn Law and Wharton Business, University of Pennsylvania
Both economics and antitrust policy have traditionally distinguished “production” from “distribution.” The former is concerned with how products are designed and built, the latter with how they are placed into the hands of consumers. Nothing in the language of the antitrust laws suggests much concern with production as such. Although courts do not view it…