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Tag: Statutory interpretation

Article

Chevron as Construction

Lawrence B. Solum, Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center

Cass R. Sunstein, Robert Walmsley University Professor, Harvard University

In 1984, the Supreme Court declared that courts should uphold agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory provisions, so long as those interpretations are reasonable. The Chevron framework, as it is called, is now under serious pressure. Current debates can be both illuminated and softened with reference to an old distinction between interpretation on the one hand…

Jul 2020

Article

The Paradoxical Impact of Scalia’s Campaign Against Legislative History

Stuart Minor Benjamin, Douglas B. Maggs Professor of Law, Duke Law School

Kristen M. Renberg, Ph.D. Candidate, Department of Political Science, Duke University & J.D. student, Duke Law School

Beginning in 1985, Judge and then Justice Antonin Scalia advocated forcefully against the use of legislative history in statutory interpretation. Justice Scalia’s position, in line with his textualism, was that legislative history was irrelevant and judges should avoid invoking it. Reactions to his attacks among Justices and prominent circuit judges had an ideological quality, with…

May 2020